

# **American Shipping Company ASA**



Company Presentation June 2020


# **Important information**



This Company Presentation is current as of June 2020. Nothing herein shall create any implication that there has been no change in the affairs of American Shipping Company ASA ("AMSC" or the "Company") since such date. This Company Presentation contains forward-looking statements relating to the Company's business, the Company's prospects, potential future performance and demand for the Company's assets, the Jones Act tanker market and other forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements concern future circumstances and results and other statements that are not historical facts, sometimes identified by the words "believes", "expects", "predicts", "intends", "projects", "plans", "estimates", "aims", "foresees", "anticipates", "targets", and similar expressions. The forward-looking statements contained in this Company Presentation, including assumptions, opinions and views of the Company or cited from third party sources, are solely opinions and forecasts which are subject to risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual events to differ materially from any anticipated development.

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


# **American Shipping Company (AMSC)**



#### Introduction to AMSC

- Established in 2005
- Oslo listed with market capitalization of USD ~150m\*
  - OSE ticker: AMSC
  - U.S. OTC ticker: ASCJF
  - Bond ticker: AMTI01
- Pure play Jones Act tanker owner with a modern tanker fleet
- Long-term bareboat contracts generate stable, predictable cash flow
- Fleet well positioned to reap upside in a rising Jones Act tanker market
- Solid balance sheet with no debt maturities before 2022




#### **Fleet overview**

# Vessel	Design	Туре	Built
1 Overseas Houston	Veteran Class MT 46	MR	2007
2 Overseas Long Beach	Veteran Class MT 46	MR	2007
3 Overseas Los Angeles	Veteran Class MT 46	MR	2007
4 Overseas New York	Veteran Class MT 46	MR	2008
5 Overseas Texas City	Veteran Class MT 46	MR	2008
6 Overseas Boston	Veteran Class MT 46	MR	2009
7 Overseas Nikiski	Veteran Class MT 46	MR	2009
8 Overseas Martinez	Veteran Class MT 46	MR	2010
9 Overseas Anacortes	Veteran Class MT 46	MR	2010
10 Overseas Tampa	Veteran Class MT 46	Shuttle tanker	2011



## Long term contracts returning stable cash flow



Long term charters with evergreen extension options offers AMSC downside protection with upside potential through a profit share mechanism with OSG

# History of stable and predictable EBITDA

Normalized EBITDA (USD millions)




22

Q3 19

21

Q4 19



### Normalized EBITDA per quarter (USD millions)

- Normalized EBITDA of USD 22.2 million every quarter is mainly based on contracted bareboat charter hire
- USD 1 million is repayments from OSG on a deferred payment obligation


## **OSG - leading Jones Act operator and strong counterpart**



#### **Diversified business across multiple segments**


- OSG's business is spanning across multiple Jones Act tanker and ATB segments as well as US Flag and Alaska crude tankers
- Overall diversified business with strong cash flow generation expected for 2020, as more than 90% of fleet has TC contract cover for the year to high credit quality end users
- AMSC's 10 vessels are a core part of OSG's Jones Act tanker fleet accounting for 50% of revenue

## Breakdown of OSG's fleet



#### **OSG** financial overview

 Q1 2020 demonstrated substantially improved revenue and EBITDA, which is expected to continue for the remainder of the year




Source: OSG Q1 2020 earnings presentation

OSG is a well capitalized and strong counterparty with a diversified U.S. Flag and Jones Act tanker operation

#### TCE Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA

# AMSC fleet is a major component of the Jones Act tanker fleet



Jones Act tanker & ATB ownership based on carrying capacity

Source: Navigistics' Wilson Gillette Report and AMSC Analysis

Note: Measured as carrying capacity by barrels and excludes 11 large Alaska Crude Tankers, but includes 2x newbuild ATS for delivery in Q2 and Q4 2020

American Shipping


Company

# Strong competitive position reduces re-chartering risk

### AMSC has the most cost-efficient fleet ...


- AMSC's bareboat rate reflects the low delivered cost
- Provides AMSC with the lowest bareboat breakeven levels in the modern Jones Act tanker fleet
- Current average bareboat rate of \$24,050 per day represents at least \$10,000 per day cost advantage compared to competitors

### Annual bareboat costs given various total capital IRRs with newbuild cost @ USD 134m and USD 150m



#### ...due to substantially lower delivered cost

- AMSC has an average delivered cost of USD107m per vessel
- Considerable lower than its peers which have either built or bought vessel at prices ranging from USD130-157m
- Current estimated newbuild cost at Philly or NASSCO would be around USD150m assuming an order for multiple vessels, with earliest delivery in 2025




Notes: 1) Based on Philly Tankers. 2) Based on newbuild cost for the tankers delivered to American Petroleum Tankers. 3) Based on total consideration for 9 vessels, including additional expenses incurred by Kinder Morgan for taking delivery of newbuilds. 4) Based on average price for 4 vessels. Source: Company materials

American Shipping Company


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


# All debt is fully supported by entire AMSC business





# Enhanced debt structure and reduced debt service




AMSC successfully closed its bank debt refinancing in April 2020 at much improved terms and increased flexibility Libor swapped for 5 years at an average rate of 0.49% for USD 220 million of the bank debt

# **Delevering through debt amortization**




Ample headroom between total debt and replacement cost parity value of fleet




## **Improved credit metrics**






### Debt / EBITDA (x)

### EBITDA / interest (x)



#### FFO / debt (%)




#### Track record of delevering and estimated improving credit metrics going forward – impact of bank refinancing only from 2020 onwards

Notes: Calculations assume USD 25m undrawn RCF capacity. Bank debt interest pro-forma for refinancing calculated assuming LIBOR = 0.493% (agreed swap rate for USD ~220m of the outstanding bank debt) for all bank debt. FFO defined as EBITDA less interest expense. Source: Company



## **Illustrative cash flow waterfall**

#### Simplified cash flow waterfall TTM and pro-forma for recent bank debt refinancing



- Bareboat charters and DPO (less SG&A) provides a comfortable cash flow for debt service
  - Stable, low risk from fully chartered fleet
- Figures pro-forma for the bank refinancing are based on a full year of debt service following the refinancing, and assumes that the RCF is fully drawn

#### Bank debt refinancing increases free cash flow substantially and allows AMSC to service Bond Coupon with ease

Note: Cash flow illustration excludes profit share. Bank debt interest pro-forma for refinancing calculated assuming LIBOR = 0.493% (agreed swap rate for USD ~220m of the outstanding bank debt) for all bank debt, and USD 25m RCF capacity undrawn. Source: Company




# Investment highlights: Q1 2020 vs Q1 2017

	Q1 2017	Q1 2020	Change
Largest listed pure play Jones Act tanker owner – with strong revenue backlog	<ul> <li>Fleet of 9x MR tankers + 1x shuttle tanker, operating in the US Jones Act market</li> <li>Average age of 8.4 years across the fleet</li> <li>USD 314m secured bareboat revenue backlog</li> <li>Average contract duration of 3.6 years</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Fleet of 9x MR tankers + 1x shuttle tanker, operating in the US Jones Act market</li> <li>Average age of 11.4 years across the fleet</li> <li>USD 300m secured bareboat revenue backlog</li> <li>Average contract duration of 3.4 years</li> </ul>	-
Business model providing stability and long-term visibility	<ul> <li>Stable cash flow from bareboat contracts at fixed rates and DPO from OSG, with attractive evergreen extension options</li> <li>Upside potential from profit share arrangement</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Announced exercise of extension options by OSG on all 10x vessels in the last two years, providing 100% utilization until end of 2022</li> <li>Distributed stable dividend of USD 0.08/quarter unchanged for the last three years</li> </ul>	1
Credit metrics	<ul> <li>Pro-forma debt to TTM EBITDA of 8.0x</li> <li>Pro-forma net debt to TTM EBITDA of 7.3x</li> <li>TTM EBITDA to interest expense of 2.2x</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Pro-forma debt to TTM EBITDA of 6.6x</li> <li>Pro-forma net debt to TTM EBITDA of 6.1x</li> <li>TTM EBITDA to interest expense 2.6x</li> </ul>	1
Solid market fundamentals	<ul> <li>Substantial fleet growth coming to an end in 2017. Some scrapping of older tonnage</li> <li>JA tanker market at a through early 2017, but with promising outlook</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Continued scrapping with orderbook close to zero added to market tightening in 2019</li> <li>Jones Act tanker rates on the rise – TC rates reached USD 60,000 per day in 2019, well above the AMSC vessels' cash breakeven for OSG</li> </ul>	1

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# Jones Act – a Vital Part of the US Economy

#### The Jones Act has been in place since 1920...

- The Jones Act generally restricts the marine transportation of cargo and passengers between points in the United States to vessels that meet the following criteria:
  - Built in the United States
  - Registered under the U.S. flag
  - Manned predominately by U.S. crews
  - At least 75% owned and controlled by U.S. citizens
  - AMSC's presence in the Jones Act market is made possible by the lease finance exception of the Jones Act
- The Jones Act is an essential feature in U.S. national security
  - Ensuring non- dependency of ships controlled by foreign nations
  - Maintaining critical domestic shipbuilding capacity
  - Supporting a domestic pool of highly skilled mariners
- The Jones Act is a significant contributor to the US economy
  - Large U.S. employer
  - Substantial amounts of capital invested

... and is a vital part of the US economy

# 100,000,000,000

USD 100bn contribution to the US domestic economy

# 30,000,000,000

USD 30bn total investment in over 40,000 vessels

# 400,000

Number of jobs directly and indirectly impacted by the US maritime industry



# **A Critical Part of Oil Majors' Transportation Logistics**


#### BAKKEN 3 2 Patoka 5 Cushing, OK PERMIAN Key US Oilfields EAGLE FORD **Clean Pipeline** Crude Pipeline Barges 6 18 **US GULF** Jones Act Tanker Routes: Delaware Bay Lightening (Crude) 1 Gulf Coast refineries to Florida and East Coast (Clean) 5 Shuttle tankers from deep water U.S. Gulf to Gulf Coast Refineries (Crude) 2 Mid-Atlantic to New England (Clean) Crude from Corpus Christi, TX to LOOP (not shown) Alaska and Intra-west coast movements (Clean/Dirty) (3) Cross-Gulf movements (Dirty) Crude from Corpus Christie and Beaumont to Northeast (4)

#### Jones Act crude oil & products primary trade routes

Source: Navigistics' Wilson Gillette Report Apr 2020


# Majority of Fleet Carry Clean Products - highly stable trade over time





#### **US Clean Product Demand stable over time**

- Total clean products demand in the US is very stable over time
- Highly inelastic to price, as only very low (below \$2pg) or very high prices(above \$4.5pg) seems to have impact on demand
- Currently fuel demand is severely impacted by "stay at home policies" across the US, caused by the Covid-19 pandemic
- EIA is forecasting a gradual return to normal demand by the end of 2020




# Short term dip in clean product demand expected to be followed by gradual recovery in 2H 2020




### Drop in clean products demand already recovering

- Demand for clean products in the USA decreased by 35% in April
- Recovery has already started as the US economy is gradually opening up



#### EIA forecast gradual recovery in 2020


- Pick up in demand for gasoline will be driven by:
  - Less interest in public transportation, less mass airline travelling, less cruise vacation
  - All leading to "Staycation" in the USA involving more automobile driving
- Demand for diesel is less impacted due its industrial nature being consumed by trucks, buses, machinery, etc.
- Demand for Jet fuel will likely suffer until commercial air traffic is back in favour



#### Source: Short-Term Energy Outlook, May 2020

#### Components of annual change






# Steady long term growth in clean product shipments to Florida




# Increasing seaborn transportation of clean products from US Gulf to East Coast

- Increasing consumption of clean products in Florida is driving demand for Jones Act tanker shipments cross US Gulf
- Over the past 10 years this trade has grown with a CAGR of about 3.5%
- Demand impact from Covid-19 mitigating measures expected to reduce shipments in 2020, but return to normal in 2021




#### **Gulf Coast to Florida Trade Lane**

- As Florida has no pipeline connection nor any refineries, all clean products consumed are supplied by sea
- Florida is sourcing 90% of its clean products demand on a Jones Act tanker from US Gulf refineries
- Florida consumption is split 65-70% Gasoline, 15-20% Diesel and 10-15% Jet fuel



# Crude trade to Northeast has remained strong despite current oil market volatility





- Historically, volumes have been driven by spread in pricing of U.S. Crude Oil vs international alternatives
- Low crude oil price and falling US oil production is potentially increasing oil price spread volatility going forward




# **Fleet Reduction as Scrapping Continues**

#### Number of vessels Scrap/lay up Tankers ATBs AMSC **Candidates for** scrapping

Fleet profile by vessel age


# Considerable fleet growth in past years, but scrapping has already reduced active fleet to 2015 levels



# **Negative Fleet Growth**



#### Net capacity reduction driven by scrapping and limited orderbook



- Since 2016, five tankers and thirteen ATBs has been scrapped, sold for operations outside the Jones Act market or gone into definite lay-up
- The entire JA tanker orderbook consist of two small barges for delivery in 2020 and no new tankers expected in the next five years
- Yard capacity for tankers are limited with NASSCO mainly building navy ships and Philly Shipyard building MARAD Training Ships
- Likely delivered cost for a newbuild is now around USD150m with first available delivery slot in 2025
- Sustainable multi-year TC rates of ~USD70,000 per day required to justify newbuilds

# Summary – long term stable business model despite short term volatility imposed by Covid-19



LONG TERM CONTRACTS PROVIDE STABLE CASH FLOW	<ul> <li>Bareboat contracts provide strong and stable cash flows</li> </ul>		
	<ul> <li>Likely to continue with OSG for many years through evergreen extension options</li> </ul>		
	<ul> <li>Most cost competitive fleet reduces re- chartering risk</li> </ul>		
INCREASING DEMAND IN KEY TRADES	<ul> <li>Continued strong crude trade from U.S. Gulf to the U.S. Northeast</li> </ul>		
	Growing clean trade into Florida and to U.S. Northeast		
	<ul> <li>Jones Act tanker market expected to remain stable despite current volatility</li> </ul>		
REDUCING FLEET CAPACITY WITH NO YARD AVAILABILTY	<ul> <li>Slim orderbook with only two replacement barges for delivery in 2020</li> </ul>		
	No available yard capacity to build Jones ACT tankers until 2025 or later		
	<ul> <li>Negative fleet growth expected next two years as scrapping of old tonnage continues</li> </ul>		
STRONG AND IMPROVING CREDIT METRICS	<ul> <li>Modest secured loan to value, leaving substantial equity support for unsecured lenders</li> </ul>		
	Contracted cash flow providing solid debt service coverage		
	<ul> <li>Significant free cash flow generation offer further liquidity buffer for creditors</li> </ul>		





